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China's banking system reform has made notable progress since 2002. After restoring 
their balance sheets, Chinese banks have aggressively increased lending and contributed 
to  supporting  the  country's  economy  given  the  global  financial  crisis.  Thus  far,  the 
regulated  deposit  and  lending  interest  rates,  undeveloped  capital  markets,  and 
restrictions  in  cross-border  capital  transactions  have  given  banks  an  advantage  in 
gaining profits. However, along with the full-blown reform of the economic system 
toward a market-oriented economy, the conditions protecting banks' profits will change 
in the future. The experiences of Japanese banks under the financial liberalization that 
occurred during the 1970s and 1980s indicate how important it is for commercial banks 
to change their business models in accordance with the fundamental changes  in the 
economy.  These  experiences  may  be  useful  for  considering  the  subsequent  reform 
process of the financial system in China. 
 
Keywords: Banking System Reform; Financial Liberalization; State-owned 
Commercial Banks; Rent for Banks 
JEL classification: G21, O16, O53, P34 
 
*Director and Senior Economist, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan 
(E-mail: kumiko.okazaki@boj.or.jp) 
** Director and Senior Economist, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan 
(E-mail: masazumi.hattori@boj.or.jp) 
***Director-General, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan (E-mail: 
wataru.takahashi@boj.or.jp) 
 
This paper is a revised version of the draft that was presented at the Symposium on the World 
Economy and China in the Post Crisis Era, hosted by the China Society of World Economics, at 
Xiamen University on October 30, 2010. We extend our heartfelt gratitude to Yu Yongding, Ba 
Shusong, Guo Pei, He Guangwen, Wei Jianing, Wu Qing and several Chinese scholars participating 
in the symposium and individual meetings in Xiamen and Beijing for their valuable comments and 
discussions. We are also very grateful to William Overholt and the research staff of the Bank of 
Japan for their constructive reviews of earlier drafts. Views expressed in this paper are those of the 




Abstract   
Abbreviations   
1. Introduction ………………………………………………………......  1 
2. Outline of the Banking System Reform in China ……………….....  2 
  (1) Gradual Implementation of the Reform ...…………………………..  2 
  (2) Reform for Diversifying Banking Institutions (1978-2001)...………  5 
  (3) Reform after the Accession to the WTO ………………………........  8 
  (4) Improvement through the Reform since 2002…………………….....  13 
3. Challenges in China's Banking System Reform at Next Stage…….  16 
  (1) China under the Global Financial Crisis…………………….............  16 
  (2) Loan Concentration in the State-owned Sectors…………………….  17 
  (3) Inefficient Fund Management ……………………………...……….  19 
  (4) Development of International Banking Business……………………  23 
  (5) Essential Structural Reform for the Further Development ………….  24 
4. Japan's Experiences under Financial Liberalization …………….  29 
  (1) Background of Financial Liberalization …………………………….  29 
  (2) Impact of the Operations and Responses of Commercial Banks …...  32 
  (3) Lessons ……………………………………………………………...  35 
5. Concluding Remarks ………………………………………………...  37 
Annexes ………………………………………………………………….  40 





ABC  Agricultural Bank of China 
AMC  asset management company 
BOC  Bank of China 
BOCOM  Bank of Communications 
BOJ  Bank of Japan 
CAR  capital adequacy ratio 
CBRC  China Banking Regulatory Commission 
CCB  China Construction Bank 
CIRC  China Insurance Regulatory Commission 
CPC  Communist Party of China 
CSRC  China Security Regulatory Commission 
ICBC  Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
IPO  initial public offering 
JGB  Japanese government bond 
JSCB  joint-stock commercial bank 
LIC  local investment company 
NPL  nonperforming loan 
PBC  People's Bank of China 
RCC  rural credit cooperative 
RMB  Renminbi 
SAFE  State Administrate Foreign Exchange 
SASAC  State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council 
SME  small- and medium-sized enterprises 
SOCB  state-owned commercial bank 
SOE  state-owned enterprise 
WTO  World Trade Organization 1 
 
1. Introduction 
In China, the banking system plays a dominant role in national fund allocation. It handles 
approximately 70 percent of the external funding for domestic non-financial sectors. Owing 
to the delayed reform of the financial system, most of the Chinese banks had poor balance 
sheets in the 1990s. The Asian financial crisis and China's accession to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) emphasized the importance of the stability of the financial system. 
Pursuing  the  national  target  of  establishing  a  well-balanced  society  also  required 
well-balanced fund allocation. Therefore, the Communist Party of China (CPC), the central 
government, and the banking institutions have accelerated reforms since 2002. 
The reform of large commercial banks has shown considerable progress. The five largest 
commercial banks are now listed at the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong and the Shanghai 
Stock  Exchange.  These  banks  have  demonstrated  significantly  better  operational 
performance  than  before.  Other  nationwide  joint-stock  commercial  banks  (JSCBs)  also 
promoted  organizational  reform  and  are  actively  expanding  their  businesses.  The 
restructuring of the local city commercial banks and rural financial institutions has been 
gathering pace. Further, the relatively stable financial system enabled China to limit the 
shock of the recent global financial crisis from spreading and to realize strong economic 
recovery. 
However, thus far, the Chinese banking system has not been functioning as an efficient 
financial intermediary. The loan concentration in the state-owned sectors continues to be 
significant, and most small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and individuals continue 
to rely largely on self-funding and informal finance. Although the regulated interest rates 
have protected the profits of banks and the state-owned sectors, the government’s artificial 
control of bank lending rather than the wide use of market tools is increasingly becoming 
difficult under the diversified and globalized economy. 
Considering the challenges of the Chinese banking system, it would be useful to review 
Japan's experiences under the financial liberalization that occurred during the 1970s and 
1980s. In the 1970s, several crucial changes occurred in the Japanese economy. However, 
the banks, by and large, could not adjust their operational style smoothly to cope with the 
new economic environment. The banks' mismanagement in terms of making adjustments to 
their operational style was one of the critical factors that caused the economic bubble in the 2 
 
late 1980s. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that the delayed reform of the regulatory 
and legal systems surrounding commercial banks was also responsible for distorting banks' 
incentive to change their business models. 
This paper briefly reviews the history of the Chinese banking system reform and especially 
examines the results of the intensive reform process since 2002. For a further discussion of 
the challenges that the Chinese financial system may face in the future, this paper also 
analyzes the behavior of the Japanese banks under the financial liberalization that occurred 
during the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
2. Outline of the Banking System Reform in China 
(1) Gradual Implementation of the Reform 
The banking institutions in China currently provide over 70 percent of the external funding 
sources of domestic non-financial sectors through  the  financial markets (Table 1)
1. The 
deposit accumulated in the banking system amounted to over 180 percent to the country's 
GDP at the end of 2010. There are more than ten types of financial institutions including 
policy banks, commercial banks, small- and medium-sized rural  financial institutions, a 
postal savings bank, and several kinds of non-bank financial institutions (Table 2). This is a 
significant change from the situation in the late 1970s when there was virtually one bank, 
the People's Bank of China (PBC), which handled small amounts of deposit (approximately 
30 percent to the GDP), and basically worked as an accountant and cashier of the state 
sectors rather than a bank. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of Non-financial Sectors' External Funding Sources in China 
(%) 
  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Bank Loans  78.7  82.4  81.2  75.2 
Equities  13.1  5.8  3.0  5.5 
Government Securities  3.6  1.7  6.3  8.8 
Enterprise Bonds  4.6  10.1  9.5  10.5 
Note: The non-financial sectors include the household, corporate, and public sectors. 
Sources: PBC China Monetary Policy Report, Quarter Four, 2008, 2009 and 2010 
                                                   
1  When foreign direct investments are included, the proportion changes in the following manner: 
bank lending 70 percent, equity issuance 6 percent, government bond issuance 9 percent, corporate 
bond issuance 5 percent, foreign direct investment 15 percent, and others -5 percent in 2008 (based 
on the flow of funds statistics). 3 
 
Table 2: Banking Institutions in China (as of the end of 2009) 
  Number of   
institutions 
Market share by 
assets (%) 
Policy Banks & China Development Bank  3  8.8 
  Policy Banks  (2)  -- 
China Development Bank  (1)  -- 
Commercial Banks  238  77.1 
  Major Commercial Banks  (17)  (65.9) 
  Large Commercial Banks  (5)  (50.9) 
Joint-stock Commercial Banks    (12)  (15.0) 
City Commercial Banks  (143)  (7.2) 
Rural Commercial Banks  (43)  (2.4) 
Foreign Banks (locally incorporated)  (35)  (1.7) 
Urban Credit Cooperatives  11  0.0 
Rural Cooperative Financial Institutions  3,295  11.0 
  Rural Credit Cooperatives  (3,056)  (7.0) 
Rural Cooperative Banks  (196)  (1.6) 
Rural Commercial Banks (duplicated)  (43)  (2.4) 
Postal Savings Bank of China  1  3.4 
New-type Rural Financial Institutions  172  -- 
  Village or Township Banks  (148)  -- 
Lending Companies  (8)  -- 
Rural Mutual Cooperatives  (16)  -- 
Non-bank Financial Institutions  180  2.0 
  Banking Asset Management Companies  (4)  -- 
Trust Companies  (58)  -- 
Finance Companies of Enterprise Groups  (91)  -- 
Foreign Finance Companies (locally incorporated)  (2)   
Financial Leasing Companies  (12)  -- 
Money Brokerage Firms  (3)  -- 
Auto Financing Companies  (10)  -- 
Note: The total number of registered banking institutions is 3,857. They possess approximately 193,000 outlets 
and 2,845 thousand employees. 
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) Annual Report 2009 
 
The Chinese economic system reform has been implemented gradually. It did not initially 
have a clearly defined goal, and the reform objectives have been readjusted cautiously and 
pragmatically to create a "socialist market economy" from the original objective of creating 
a "planned economy supplemented with some market elements" (Table 3). As an important 
part of the reform, the banking system reform also took gradual steps. Nonetheless, the 
banking institutions were required to carry out several drastic reforms in order to provide 
enough funds for economic development and social stability of the country (Figure 1).   4 
 
Table 3: Objectives of the Economic System Reform in China 
Time  Key characterizations of reform objectives 
1978– Oct. 1984  Planned economy supplemented with some market elements 
Oct. 1984– Oct. 1987  Planned commodity economy 
Oct. 1987 – June 1989  The state controls the market, and the market guides enterprises 
June 1989 – 1991  Organic integration of planned economy and market regulations 
1992  Share-holding system and security market can function under socialism   
Oct. 1992  Socialist market economy 
1994  Corporatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and reform of property 
rights 
1997  Developing the state sector together with all kinds of ownership 
Grasping the large SOEs while letting small ones go to the market 
July 2001  Three representative functions of the Communist Party; permission for 
owners of private and individual enterprises to be Communist Party 
members; further development of various ownership forms 
Sources: Fan [2002 and 2003] 
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(2) Reform for Diversifying Banking Institutions (1978–2001) 
Abolishment of the Mono-banking System 
When China started the "reform and opening policy" in 1978, the CPC and the central 
government of China decided to abolish the soviet style mono-banking system. Four banks 
were reestablished or separated from the PBC, and the PBC was clearly defined as the 
central bank (but a part of the government) in 1984. Since the four banks were initially 
assigned a special function, they were termed state-owned specialized banks (Table 4). 
 
Table 4: Core Assignments of State-owned Specialized Banks in early1980s 




Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC) 
1979  To manage funds for supporting rural and agriculture sectors. 
To direct rural credit cooperatives. 
Bank of China (BOC)  1979  To finance foreign trade and investment. 
China Construction 
Bank (CCB) 
1979  To manage funds for capital construction investment. 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China (ICBC) 
1984  To finance business activities of the state-owned enterprises. 
To collect savings in the urban area. 
Note: The China Construction Bank had been named the People's Construction Bank of China until March 1996. 
Source: Shang [2000] 
 
In the mid-1980s, the government ordered the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to shift their 
funding  sources  from  the  direct  grants  by  the  central  or  local  governments  to 
interest-bearing bank loans, and the role of the Chinese banks was transformed from that of 
a government grant distributor to that of a creditor. Simultaneously, the government relaxed 
the restrictions on the business-areas of the state-owned specialized banks, and permitted 
the establishment of several new banks in order to ensure that newly developing business 
sectors and local construction projects could receive financial services more readily. 
Reform toward Establishing the "Socialist Market Economy" 
The 14th National Congress of the CPC in October 1992 formally approved the concept of 
the "socialist market economy." Subsequently, the banking system reform set a focus on 
developing commercial business widely. The government established three policy banks in 
1994 (the State Development Bank
2, the Export-Import Bank of China, and the Agricultural 
                                                   
2  The English name of the bank was subsequently changed to the China Development Bank. 6 
 
Development Bank of China) in order to separate policy lending from commercial lending. 
The four state-owned specialized banks were changed to be termed state-owned commercial 
banks (SOCBs) and were encouraged to develop their commercial business. The Law of the 
People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks was promulgated in 1995. It aimed to 
enhance  the  independence  of  the  commercial  banks  from  the  intervention  by  the 
government.   
However, the Law also required commercial banks to conduct business in accordance with 
the national industrial policies. In the 1990s, among many economic policy targets,  the 
SOEs' revitalization was given priority in order to secure sufficient employment for social 
stability. More problematically, the local governments of China were often reported to be 
neglecting the spirit of the law, and compelled the local branches of the SOCBs to provide 
as much lending as they required. 
From  1992  to  1994,  China  experienced  severe  overheating  of  the  economy  owing  to 
aggressive  investment  over  the  country.  The  central  government  had  introduced  rather 
strong tightening policies since the middle of 1993, a part of which resulted in suspension 
of many local construction projects and bankruptcy of enterprises. Under the process, the 
Chinese banks accumulated large volumes of NPLs. It was widely regarded that most of the 
NPLs of the SOCBs at that time were a result of the old economic system and political 
interventions
3. 
Trials for SOCBs' Rehabilitation in the late 1990s 
When the Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997, the leaders of the CPC and the central 
government recognized the importance of financial stability. In November 1997, they held 
the First National Financial Work Conference in order to discuss the policies for restoring 
order  in  the  financial  system  in  China.  Following  the  conference,  a  series  of  policy 
arrangements were intensively implemented, especially for the purpose of rehabilitating the 
SOCBs  which  provided  over  70  percent  of  the  total  bank  loans  in  the  country.  The 
                                                   
3  The PBC Governor Zhou Xiaochuan explained the causes of the SOCBs' NPLs in the following 
manner: 30 percent of the NPLs were a result of government's economic plans or administrative 
intervention, another 30 percent were the political requirements for SOCBs to support SOEs, 10 
percent were attributed to the SOEs' restructuring processes, 10 percent were the local governments' 
interventions,  and  20  percent  were  a  result  of  the  inner  management  problems  of  the  SOCBs 
themselves (Wu [2010]). 7 
 
abolishment of the credit plan
4, capital injection by the government, change of the loan 
classification  system,  and  transfer  of  the  NPLs  to  newly  established  asset  management 
companies (AMCs) were the new concepts that aimed at recovering the SOCBs' functions
5. 
Despite the effort, the balance sheets of the SOCBs remained poor with inadequate capital 
and significant amounts of NPLs (Table 5). Later, the Chinese government reviewed the 
situation and found that the government actions in 1998 had been focused on reducing the 
financial difficulties of banks rather than on solving inherent structural problems, and it had 
become evident that the banks' financial distress was more serious than had been recognized 
(Liu [2004]). 
 
Table 5: NPL Ratios and Capital Adequacy Ratios of the SOCBs (1997-2002) 
  ICBC  ABC  BOC  CCB 
NPL Ratios (%) 
1997  The average of four banks: more than 25% 
2002  25.69  36.63  23.37  16.97 
Capital Adequacy Ratios (%) 
1997  4.05  2.93  3.91  3.54 
1998  10.40  8.13  11.74  9.31 
1999  4.57  1.44  8.50  3.79 
2000  5.38  n.a.  9.80  6.51 
2001  5.76  1.44  8.30  6.88 
2002  5.54  n.a.  8.15  6.91 
Sources：CBRC, Cao [2006], and banks' annual reports 
 
Delayed Reform in Rural Financial System 
In  the  late  1990s,  the  financial  system  in  China's  rural  area  also  encountered  serious 
problem. The SOCBs withdrew from the rural area in accordance with the government's 
guidance for restructuring their branch networks (in order to improve their profitability). 
The rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) and policy banks were expected to close the gap that 
                                                   
4  The  credit  plan  had  been a  main  measure  for  the  central  government  (including  the PBC)  to 
control fund allocation in China. The State Planning Commission, working with the PBC, imposed 
an  annual  credit  plan  on  financial  institutions.  The  national  credit  plan  was  broken  down  into   
lending quotas for provinces. Simultaneously, the PBC allocated an annual credit quota to each 
major bank, and it divided the quota into lending quotas for the provincial-level branches. The PBC 
monitored the usage of the quota (Lardy [1998]). 
5  See Okazaki [2007] in detail. 8 
 
the SOCBs' withdrawal had created. However, they could hardly expand lending. The lack 
of funding sources and deteriorated balance sheets prevented them from extending loans to 
new customers. As a result, individuals and enterprises in rural areas had to largely depend 
on informal finance
6. 
In the rural area, it was becoming evident that the postal savings system was not efficient in 
the  allocation  of  funds  across  the  country.  When  the  Chinese  government  resumed  the 
postal savings system in 1986
7, the system design was mainly focused on absorbing the 
retail savings of individuals. All the savings that the system collected were required to be 
deposited into the PBC's account, and the PBC reallocated the  fund, mainly by lending 
funds to policy banks and RCCs. However, during the late 1990s, the differences in the 
interest  rates  of  the  postal  savings  system  distorted  the  efficiency  of  fund  allocation, 
especially in the rural area
8. 
(3) Reform after the Accession to the WTO 
After China joined the WTO in December 2001, the CPC and the State Council held the 
Second National Financial Work Conference in February 2002 in order to discuss how to 
make China's  financial system  more  stable, efficient, and competitive  under the intense 
pressure of further opening the country's economy. The conference paid special attention to 
several serious issues in the financial sector including the incomplete supervisory system, 
unsustainable  and  loose  management  mechanisms  of  financial  institutions,  weak 
mechanisms for protecting the legal rights and interests of financial institutions, lack of staff 
with specialized financial knowledge and skills, lack of business innovation by financial 
                                                   
6  The informal finance generally means unauthorized financing activities, conducted through family 
and friends, local money houses, or other types of financial associations. There are different versions 
of  the  definition  of  the  informal  finance  in  China,  and  its  meaning  is  partly  overlapped  with 
"underground  finance"  and  "illegal  finance"  (Li  [2009]).  Jiang  [2009]  mentions  that  the  PBC 
estimated the scale of the informal finance in China at around RMB 950 in 2003, accounting for 
about 7 percent of GDP and 6 percent of total bank loans. 
7  The Chinese government abolished the postal savings system in 1950. 
8  At the end of 1999, although the PBC's deposit rate on postal savings was 4.6008 percent, the 
PBC's lending rate to financial institutions was 3.78 percent. This implies that the PBC made a loss 
when it accepted the postal savings system's deposits and lent them to policy banks and RCCs. At 
the same time, the interest rate on one year term residential deposit of financial institutions including 
the postal savings system was 2.25 percent. From this, the postal savings system could earn an 
increased interest of 2.3508 percent per year without any credit risk. Such a situation distorted the 
fair competition in collecting deposits between the postal savings system and RCCs. 9 
 
institutions, and disorder in parts of the financial market (People's Daily [2002]). After the 
conference, several structural reforms were implemented. 
Regulatory Framework 
The  China  Banking  Regulatory  Commission  (CBRC),  a  new  regulatory  organization 
officially began its operation in April 2003. The CBRC was created in order to meet the 
requirement for a specialized regulatory organization for an increasingly complex banking 
system that was to be completely opened to foreign financial institutions by the end of 2006. 
Currently, the regulatory and supervisory functions of the financial sector are assigned to 
the  CBRC,  China  Securities  Regulatory  Commission  (CSRC),  and  China  Insurance 
Regulatory  Commission  (CIRC)
9.  The  PBC  is  also  responsible  for  preventing  and 
mitigating systemic financial risks in order to maintain financial stability. The PBC and 
three  regulatory  commissions  as  well  as  the  State  Administration  of  Foreign  Exchange 
(SAFE) have regular meetings for ensuring effective policy coordination (PBC [2010]). 
State-owned Commercial Banks 
With respect to the banking system reform, the conference focused on the rehabilitation of 
the  SOCBs  again.  The  government  finally  acknowledged  that  the  unclear  ownership 
system
10, vulnerability to political pressures, and lack of disclosure had made most of the 
banks and their interested parties reluctant to reform the old business customs. It proposed 
to  convert  the  SOCBs  into  joint-stock  commercial  banks,  which  would  be  listed  once 
conditions had improved. In order to promote this reform, a cross-ministries project team, 
the Central Leading Group on Reforming SOCBs, was established
11. The team planned to 
reform the four SOCBs and the Bank of Communications (BOCOM)
12. 
                                                   
9  The PBC initially had supervisory authority in the banking as well as the security and insurance 
sectors. Along with the development of the financial industries, the CSRC was established in 1992, 
and the CIRC was established in 1998. 
10  In the 1990s, the  meaning of the  "state-owned"  was  ambiguous in China. It was not clearly 
defined who or which organization was vested with the ownership of the SOCBs, nor what kind of 
responsibilities that the owners had. 
11  The  team  was  headed  by  Vice  Premier  Huang  Ju,  and  managed  by  PBC  Governor  Zhou 
Xiaochuan. 
12  The BOCOM was previously defined as a non-listed JSCB; however at the third stage of the 
country’s banking system reform, it was considered to be a type of SOCB because the Ministry of 
Finance had been a major shareholder (owning approximately 30 percent of the capital), and the 
bank had often been expected to provide loans in the same manner as SOCBs. 10 
 
Owing  to  the  differences  in  the  conditions  at  these  banks,  the  procedures  for  their 
transformations had different courses. However, the basic concept was common across all 
the banks; the final goal was to transform them into joint-stock commercial banks listed on 
stock  exchanges  through  initial  public  offerings  (IPOs)  and  improve  their  corporate 
governance  and  management  efficiency.  The  government  prepared  the  following  four 
measures in order to support this restructuring: capital injection by the government fund, 
issuance of subordinated bonds (in order to supplement the capital) in the market, disposal 
of NPLs through AMCs, and introduction of foreign strategic investors (Table 6). 
 
Table 6: Major Arrangements for the Structural Reform of SOCBs since 2002 
 
  ICBC  ABC  BOC  CCB  BOCOM 
Month and Year of 
Reorganization  Oct. 2005  Jan. 2009  Aug. 2004  Sept. 2004  June 2004 
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Sources：Web site of each bank 
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Compared  with  the  rescue  arrangements  for  the  SOCBs  during  the  late  1990s,  the 
restructuring scheme  since 2002 was more comprehensive and transparent. It employed 
market-oriented mechanisms for disposing the NPLs and supplementing the banks' capital. 
The government introduced the auction system partially for inducing the SOCBs to sell 
NPLs to the AMCs. The subordinated bonds were issued in the inter-bank bond market
13. 
The IPOs required a more extensive and comprehensive disclosure of the banks' operating 
conditions and government's supervisory guidance than before. 
Joint-stock Commercial Banks and Policy Banks 
A majority of the  twelve JSCBs had been relatively market-oriented  and free from the 
historical  burden  that  originated  in  the  planned  economy.  However,  they  were  not 
completely free from political intervention (especially from local interest groups). In order 
to improve corporate governance, the joint stock commercial banks were also required to be 
publicly listed
14. 
The  reforms  of  the  three  policy  banks  were  implemented  under  the  principal  of 
"differentiated guidance, and one policy package for one bank." It was decided that the 
China Development Bank would be a commercial bank and the Agricultural Development 
Bank of China and the Export-Import Bank of China would continue to be a policy bank. 
All of them received public capital injection in order to improve their balance sheets. 
Rural Financial System   
The reform in the rural financial sector has made certain progress since 2003. The Ministry 
of Finance and the PBC provided financial support for conducting the structural reforms of 
the RCCs. The CBRC, PBC, and the provincial governments cooperated with one another 
in order to manage the RCCs' ownership structure reforms and the disposal of NPLs. Before 
the reform, there were approximately 40 thousand RCCs in China, and the structure of their 
ownership  and  organization  were  too  vague  to  ensure  the  efficient  and  transparent 
management.  The government encouraged them to be merged in to  three types of  new 
                                                   
13  Currently  in  China,  the  inter-bank  bond  market  (yinhangjian  zhaiquan  shichang  in  Chinese) 
allows  the  authorized  non-bank  institutions  such  as  security  firms,  insurance  companies,  and 
enterprises,  as  well  as  commercial  banks  to  sell  and  purchase  government  bonds  and  corporate 
bonds. 
14  In  the  1990s,  only  two  banks,  the  Shenzhen  Development  Bank  and  the  Shanghai  Pudong 
Development Bank, were listed at the stock exchanges. 12 
 
institutions  (integrated  provincial  credit  cooperatives,  rural  cooperative  banks,  and  rural 
commercial banks) in order to improve their corporate governance and, thereby, to utilize 
limited fund resources. One of the critical points of the reorganization is what "cooperative" 
means: a majority of the owners of the RCCs must be individual farmers and not local 
enterprises established by local governments. 
Considering the poor network and limited competition among financial services in rural 
areas, the CBRC relaxed its market-entry policy in December 2006 after the completion of 
the two-year pilot programs for establishing new types of rural financial institutions. These 
financial institutions, including village or township banks, lending companies, and rural 
mutual  credit  cooperatives,  require  smaller  capital  and  fewer  shareholders  for  their 
foundation. The government also had an intention to transform a part of informal financial 
institutions that had been functioning for the local economic development to the authorized 
retail financial institutions by relaxing the requirements for market-entry. 
The reform of the postal savings system also entered a new stage. In July 2005, the State 
Council approved the overall reform plan of the postal system of China which included the 
postal savings system reform. Initially, the postal savings system only absorbed deposits 
and passed them to the PBC, without extending local lending, and eventually, it became a 
channel to transfer rural money into urban areas for the construction of cities. In order to 
use the rural residents' deposits for their own sake, the regulation was changed, and the 
Postal Savings Bank of China was officially established in March 2007. Today, the bank, 
which is the fifth largest bank in China in terms of the size of customers' deposits, extends 
retail loans to individuals and small enterprises both in urban and rural areas. 
Accounting System 
The accounting system was altered gradually in order to improve the transparency in the 
management and operation of banks. In January 2002, the Ministry of Finance implemented 
a  new  accounting  procedure  with  the  guideline  "Accounting  System  for  Financial 
Institutions,"  which  intended  to  implement  the  international  accounting  standards.  The 
global IPOs compelled major Chinese banks to follow the international standards, and most 




(4) Improvement through the Reform since 2002 
By the end of 2010, sixteen commercial banks (five large commercial banks
15, eight joint 
stock commercial banks, and three city banks) were listed at the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange, among which eight banks are also listed at the Stock Exchange of Hong 
Kong. At the end of 2010, the ICBC and CCB ranked as the world's top two banks in terms 
of  market  capitalization,  and  the  BOC  and  ABC  held  the  sixth  and  eighth  position 
respectively  (Table  7).  The  share  prices  of  these  four  Chinese  banks  may  be  distorted 
because over 60 percent of the shares are held by either the government or governmental 
organizations, and are not freely traded on stock exchanges. Nonetheless, this is a symbolic 
change at Chinese banks. 
 
Table 7: World's Largest 10 Banks in Terms of Market Capitalization (at the end of 2010) 
 
Rank  Name  Country 
Market Cap 
(US$ billion) 
1  ICBC  China  233.69 
2  CCB  China  225.89 
3  HSBC  UK  184.98 
4  Wells Fargo  USA  164.84 
5  JP Morgan Chase  USA  163.31 
6  BOC  China  142.64 
7  Citigroup Inc.  USA  140.30 
8  ABC  China  135.26 
9  Bank of America  USA  133.38 
10  Itaú Unibanco  Brazil  94.45 
Source: BanksDaily.com 
 
At first glance, the large Chinese commercial banks can compete with the world's top-class 
banks in terms of the asset and capital sizes. The quality of their assets also improved. The 
following are the main favorable results of the banking system reform in China since 2002. 
Size and Quality of Assets 
Table 8 shows the rapid increase of the total assets of major Chinese commercial banks in 
2009. At the end of 2004, only five Chinese banks were ranked among the world's 100 
largest banks; however, in five years, this number increased to eleven, primarily owing to 
the increase in the amount of loans that were extended to domestic customers. 
                                                   
15  The CBRC changes the category name of the SOCBs to "large commercial banks," although the 
government maintains the status of the major share holders of these banks. 14 
 
Table 8: Development of Total Assets of Domestic Banks in China (at the end of 2009) 
World 
Ranking  Name 
Total Assets 
(US$ billion) 
Year on year 
Change (%) 
11  ICBC  1,726  20.9 
18  CCB  1,409  27.5 
20  ABC  1,301  26.8 
22  BOC  1,281  26.0 
46  BOCOM  485  23.7 
63  China Merchants Bank  303  31.7 
72  China CITIC Bank  260  34.7 
81  Shanghai Pudong Development Bank  238  24.0 
89  China Minsheng Banking Corp.  209  35.4 
93  Industrial Bank  195  30.6 
100  China Everbright Bank  175  40.7 
Source: The Banker July 2010, except that the data of the ABC is based on the bank's annual report, and 
the world rankings of the ABC and BOC are based on the authors' calculation. 
 
The  quality  of  the  assets  of  Chinese  banks  has  significantly  improved  owing  to  the 
government's support in the disposal of NPLs by the large commercial banks (Figure 2). 
The NPL ratio of the major commercial banks, which cover over 60 percent of the total 
assets of the Chinese banking sector, decreased to 1.2 percent at the end of 2010 from 23.1 
percent at the end of 2002. The NPL ratio of rural cooperative institutions, which handle 
approximately 10 percent of the total loans, continued to be high (10.9 percent) even at the 
end of 2009; however, there was an improvement in this ratio. At the end of 2006, when the 
new loan classification system was implemented, this ratio was 27.9 percent. 
 




























The  government's  capital  injection  and  banks'  fund  raising  in  the  markets  significantly 
increased the capital of the banks. By the end of 2009, all the commercial banks cleared the 
CBRC's requirement of the capital adequacy ratio (CAR, 8 percent or above). This is also a 
significant change from the end of 2003 when only eight banks, which shared 0.6 percent of 
the total assets in the banking sector, cleared the target.   
The weighted average of the commercial banks' CARs was 11.4 percent at the end of 2009; 
this was lower than the CAR of 12.0 percent a year ago, reflecting rapid growth in lending. 
Currently, the CBRC requires the large commercial banks to maintain their CARs at 11.5 
percent or above, and the small- and medium-sized commercial banks to maintain their 
CARs at 10.0 percent or above. Several major commercial banks obtained permission from 
the CBRC to issue additional shares or subordinated bonds in 2009 and 2010. 
Profitability 
The major listed commercial banks enjoyed favorable operating results over the last three 
years (Figure 3). On an average, in 2009, 82 percent of the operating profit of these banks 
came from the net interest income, and 13 percent from the net fee-based income. These 
favorable  operating  results  were  largely  a  result of  the  increase  of  loans.  Although  the 
interest rate spread became narrower in 2009, it remained over 2 percent points (Figure 4). 
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Sources: Annual reports of ICBC, CCB, BOC and BOCOM 
 
3. Challenges in China's Banking System Reform at Next Stage 
(1) China under the Global Financial Crisis 
From 2002 to 2007, the Chinese economy had followed a high growth trend boosted by the 
rapid  increase  of  export  and  fixed  asset  investment.  In  2007,  some  signs  of  economic 
overheating  appeared  in  the  stock  market,  property  market,  and  a  part  of  commodity 
markets. The CPI also showed an increasing trend in the year. Under such condition, the 
central government took tightening policies, and the GDP growth rate started to slow down 
in  the  third  quarter  of  2007.  Before  the  effect  of  the  government  policies  was  fully 
confirmed, the global financial crisis hit the Chinese economy. The economy displayed a 
steep fall in the latter half of 2008, owing to a severe decline in the demand from the major 
international  trading  partners.  However,  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  the  year,  the  Chinese 
government declared to implement a large scale of stimulus policies so that the economy 
would escape from falling into a deep recession, and eventually, the economy picked up 
quickly from the second quarter of 2009 (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: Real GDP Growth Rate of China 
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On the recovering process of the economy, the Chinese banks played an important role. 
Supported by the aforementioned structural reforms and the relatively strict control of the 
cross-border capital transactions, the Chinese banks did not suffer serious damages from the 
crisis, and they provided abundant funds for boosting the economy (Table 9). However, the 
observation  on  bank  lending  since  2008  indicates  that  the  Chinese  banking  system 
possesses several risks and challenges for it to move to a more market-oriented economy. 
 
Table 9: Amount of Net Increase of RMB Bank Loans in China 
(RMB trillion) 
  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010 
Target of the net increase of bank loans set by 
the government at the beginning of the year  2.5  2.9  3.6  over  5  7.5 
Actual amount of the net increase of bank loans    3.18  3.63  4.91  9.59  7.95 
Source: PBC, Xinhua News and People's Daily 
 
(2) Loan Concentration in the State-owned Sectors 
SOE's Advantages as a Borrower 
When the commercial banks  have been extending loans rather actively since the fourth 
quarter of 2008, the lending for investment projects initiated by the government has been 
favoring  SOEs  over  private  enterprises.  Additionally,  it  has  also  been  favoring  large 
companies over SMEs. 
Deng [2010] argues on the situation of the "Guojin Mintui (the state sector advances and the 
private  sector  retreats),"  pointing  that  bank  lending  in  recent  years  has  been  mostly 
extended to large-sized SOEs
16, because (1) banks regard that the loans to the SOEs are 
mostly secured by the central and/or local governments
17, (2) the loans to the large-sized 
SOEs are able to gain the effect of the economies of scale, and (3) commercial banks are 
paying much more attention to their own profits after being listed. 
                                                   
16  In 2009, about 50 percent of the SOCBs' loans are extended to large-sized SOEs. On the other 
hand, the amount of the lending from all banking institutions to private enterprises was only 14 
percent of the total lending. If we focused on the short-term lending, the share is lower than 3.4 
percent (Deng [2010]). 
17  According to the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC), there were 143 thousand SOEs in China at the end of 2008. Currently, about 120 
SOEs are termed "Central SOEs", which are supervised by the SASAC directly. Other local SOEs 
are supervised by the local governments. 18 
 
The central government does not officially admit the appearance of the "Guojin Mintui."
18 
However,  it  recognizes  the  risks  of  the  loan  concentration.  The  CBRC  Chairman  Liu 
Mingkang indicates that the credit risk of commercial banks is increasing; this is because 
the bank loans that have been extended since 2008 tended to be concentrated in heavy 
chemical  industry  and  property  industry,  large  corporations  and  local  governments' 
investment vehicles, and medium- and long-term projects (Liu [2010]). 
SMEs' Difficulties in Accessing Bank Loans 
In China, the SMEs' difficulty in accessing bank loans has been a serious issue since the 
1990s. The private sector, which comprises a number of SMEs, has been largely relying on 
self-funding and informal finance. When the PBC strictly restrained the increase in bank 
lending  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  2007,  commercial  banks  reduced  loans  to  SMEs 
disproportionately.  According  to  Li  Zishan,  Chairman  of  the  SMEs  Association,  the 
proportion of bank loans for SMEs to the total outstanding of loans dropped from 22.5 
percent to 15 percent after the central bank tightened the monetary policy
19. The Zhejiang 
Office of the CBRC reported that according to survey results from the Wenzhou enterprises' 
financing sources, the proportion of bank loans to the SMEs declined from 24 percent in 
2006 to 18 percent in 2008
20. 
The  government  has  been  encouraging  banks  to  extend  loans  to  profitable  private 
enterprises, and the PBC abolished the ceiling of the commercial banks' lending interest rate 
(leaving the regulation on the floor of the rate) in October 2004. However, thus far, there 
have  been  little  changes  in  the  loan  pricing  environment  for  SMEs.  In  addition  to  the 
above-mentioned factors strengthening the commercial banks' preference for SOEs, it is 
widely pointed out that the lack of guarantees and unreliable accounting practice of SMEs 
are the common obstacles for extending bank loans to SMEs. 
 
                                                   
18  Li Xiaonan, the Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of State-owned Large Enterprises, denies 
the view that the SOEs' dominance of the markets makes private enterprises difficult to survive (Li 
[2010]). 
19  http://news.hexun.com.2008-11-21/111513025.html  (original  news  source:  an  interview  at  the 
CCTV program) 
20  According to the PBC, the amount of bank loan to SMEs increased by 31 percent in 2009, led by 
the government's strong guidance. 19 
 
Local Investment Companies' Expansion 
Since 2009, issues on the bank lending to the so-called local investment companies (LICs
21) 
have been attracting strong concerns of the central government. When the Chinese local 
governments carry out construction projects, they often use the LICs as financing vehicles. 
Because  the  local  governments  are  legally  prohibited  to  obtain  fund  sources  from  the 
markets  directly
22,  they  establish  the  LICs  as  independent  entities  for  funding  of 
construction projects. There were over 8 thousand LICs in China at the end of 2009. And in 
recent years, they were aggressively carrying out various kinds of infrastructure projects, 
being encouraged by the central government's stimulus policies. 
The CBRC and PBC found that there were risks behind the extremely rapid increase of 
bank lending to the LICs, and ordered banks to review the LICs' financial condition in detail. 
In October 2010, the initial review process was finished, and the banks reported that the 
bank loans to the LICs amounted to RMB 7.66 trillion (17 percent of the total bank loans in 
local currency) at the end of June 2010, among which the loans amounting to about RMB 2 
trillion (26 percent of the total lending to LICs) might have a problem
23. 
 
(3) Inefficient Fund Management 
Limited Usage of Interest Rate Mechanism in the Monetary Policy 
Among the major monetary policy tools in China (interest rates, open market operations, 
reserve requirement ratios, and the window guidance), interest rates have not been flexibly 
used  for  adjusting  economic  conditions.  Figure  6  indicates  that  as  compared  to  the 
fluctuations  in  nominal  GDP  and  CPI,  changes  in  the  benchmark  lending  and  deposit 
interest  rates  were  small.  Instead,  the  PBC  frequently  changed  the  reserve  requirement 
ratios in recent years (Figure 7), and strengthened the window guidance in order to control 
the growth of bank loans
24. It should be noted that the difference between the benchmark 
                                                   
21  In Chinese, "difang rong touzi pingtai (local financing plat form)." 
22  The Budget Law prohibits local governments from issuing bonds, the Lending General Provisions 
prohibits them from receiving a loan, and the Security Law prohibits them from offering anything as 
collateral. 
23  At the end of 2010, most of the bank loans to the LICs had not become NPLs, and in January 
2011, the CBRC admitted that banks had demonstrated certain improvements in restraining the risks 
of those loans. However, the CBRC continues to exercise caution on this issue. 
24  For  information  on  the  window  guidance  implementation  and  its  effectiveness  in  China,  see 
Fukumoto, Higashi, Inamura, and Kimura [2010]. 20 
 
lending interest rate and the benchmark deposit interest rate has not been changed largely 
since the late 1990s. The government seemed to pay strong attention to the banks' profit 
when the organizational reforms of major commercial banks were on the process
25. 
 












Source: NBSC and PBC 
 













                                                   
25  The former PBC Governor, Dai Xianglong (who held this position from 1995 to 2002), formally 
explained that the PBC synthetically considered the following factors while determining the interest 
rates: (1) the condition of general prices, (2) impact to large and medium-sized SOEs' profitability 
through interest rate payment, (3) impact to banks' profit and tax payment, and (4) national policy 
and social demand for money. Dai also added that the PBC studied the movement of interest rates in 
the international markets as a reference (Dai [2001]). It seemed that the Chinese government paid 
relatively strong attention to the financial results of the SOCBs from 2003 to 2010 in order to 
complete the IPOs in success. The manner in which the PBC currently considers these factors is not 
very lucid. However, in recent years, the PBC appears to pay much more attention to the US dollar 
interest  rates  in  order  to  maintain  the  stability  of  exchange  rates  and  restrain  the  inflow  of 
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Commercial Banks' Little Attention to Interest Rate Risks 
Thus far, the most of Chinese commercial banks do not seem to pay strong attention to the 
risks of interest rate fluctuation. Although the interest rates in the interbank money markets 
and bond markets in China had been liberalized by 1999, the impact of the interest rates' 
movement to the commercial banks' profits has been relatively limited. Because of the strict 
control of capital transactions and the limited variety of financial products provided to the 
non-financial corporations and individuals, the large Chinese commercial banks do not face 
difficulty  of  gaining  deposits
26.  Since  the  funding  cost  for  lending  is  relatively  low, 
commercial banks eager to extend loans as much as possible.   
Large Fluctuations in Bank Lending 
In China, bank loans tend to increase during the first quarter of the year, mainly because of 
the country's business and social customs
27. However, the volume of the increase in the 
loans extended by banks, especially in January, has been remarkably large over the recent 
years (Figure 8). This is closely related to the targets of the government's economic policy 
and commercial banks' management of business operation. 
 











                                                   
26  During last 10 years, the local currency deposit has been increasing annually by about 20 percent 
on average. 
27  Traditionally, the demand for money both in the business sector and the households increases 
around the new year day of the lunar calendar (in January or February) for the settlement of credit, 
payout of employee bonuses, purchase of new year gifts, travel, etc. In addition, most of the public 
construction projects are managed by an annual base and begin in January. Banks are requested to 

































































































At  the  National  People's  Congress  in  March,  where  the  Congress  authorizes  the 
government's  basic  policy  for  the  year,  the  central  government  makes  commitments  to 
achieve several economic policy targets including the pace of the increase of money supply 
and the volume of net increase in the total bank loans extended (e.g., RMB 7.5 trillion in 
2010, Table 9 above). Before the year-end, the PBC persuades (or orders) commercial banks 
to adjust the amount of loans in order to achieve the policy target. When the increase in the 
actual amount of loans is rather large, the PBC guides commercial banks to stop extending 
new loans or to reduce the amount of loans already extended. Such a situation often occurs 
in November and December, and owing to the repression of bank loans during these two 
months, the loans that are extended in January, when a new fiscal year begins, appear as a 
surge in the supply of new loans. If commercial banks expect a possible change in the 
funding cost in the future, they would have been more cautious to extend loans. 
Regarding the fluctuation of the bank lending, it showed an unusual movement in early 
2009. When the government encouraged commercial banks to increase lending as early as 
possible in the late 2008, the commercial banks could not find enough projects in a short 
time, and extended a short-term lending to the old SOE customers. A sudden increase in the 
bill discount and a rapid decline of its interest rate in the first quarter of 2009 indicate the 
commercial banks' aggressiveness in lending through bill discount (Figure 9 and 10).   
 
Figure 9: Net Increase of Bank Lending     Figure 10: Interest Rates of Bill Discount 
and Time-Deposit 
Source: PBC                                                                    Sources: PBC and Zhongguo Piaoju Wang 

































The  interest  rate  for  bill  discount  was  basically  determined  in  the  market,  and  the 
competition among commercial banks' lowered the rate quickly in January 2009. According 
to several news media reports, commercial banks did not change the deposit rate largely, 
although they could lower the deposit rate (since the central bank abolished the floor of 
deposit interest rate in 2004)
28. Since commercial banks in China are required to maintain 
the ratios of loans to deposits basically at 75 percent or lower, banks usually do not reduce 
the  amount  of  deposits.  Under  such  situation,  many  large-sized  SOEs  increased  bill 
discount borrowing, and deposited the money to another bank so that they could gain profits 
from the interest differences. Many SOEs were also reported that they did not deposit in the 
banks, but used the money for investment in property or stock markets. 
 
(4) Development of International Banking Business 
Because of the strict control of the cross-border capital transaction, the amount of Chinese 
portfolio investment abroad and other capital movement through banking accounts (lending 
and trade finance) is still small. However, since the enterprises' international businesses are 
expanding, motivated by the government's "go global" policy, some commercial banks have 
started preparations for expanding business abroad (Table 10). 
 
Table 10: Press Releases on International Businesses of Chinese Banks 

















CITIC Bank agrees to purchase 70 percent stake in Citic International (in Hong Kong). 
ICBC agrees to purchase 70 percent stake in the Bank East Asia (Canada) Ltd.   
CCB opens New York Branch and CCB (London) Ltd. 
ICBC agrees to purchase stake in ACL Bank Public Company Ltd. (in Thailand). 
ICBC opens Hanoi Branch 
BOC opens Perth Branch 
BOC opens Brisbane Branch and BOC (Brazil). 
CCB opens Ho Chi Minh City Branch. 
ICBC opens ICBC (Malaysia) Ltd. 
BOC opens Kelang Branch (in Malaysia) and three sub-branches in Jakarta 
ICBC opens Abu Dhabi Branch. 
CCB opens Sydney Branch 
BOC opens branches in Penang, Dusseldorf, and Brussels. 
ICBC opens branches in Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Milan and Madrid. 
ICBC agrees to purchase 80 percent stake in the Bank East Asia (USA) N.A. 
BOCOM opens Ho Chi Minh City Branch. 
Sources: Zhongguo Hanggye Yanjiu Baogao Wang (http://www.chinahyyj.com) and press releases of each bank 
                                                   
28  Since October 2004, the PBC's benchmark interest rates are only implemented for the ceiling of 
deposit rate, and the floor of lending rate. 24 
 
In addition, the Chinese government initiated a few pilot projects for the internationalization 
of the RMB in recent years. The ideas are: the offshore and onshore settlement of RMB 
payments related to international trade, and an offshore issuance of bonds denominated in 
RMB. It appears that the Chinese government is still very cautious in relaxing the foreign 
exchange control regulations. However, the globalization of the Chinese economy would go 
on further, and banks would be required to support it. 
Regarding the international banking business, Hong Kong has played important roles and 
would continue to do in the future. Norman T. L. Chan, Chief Executive of the Hong Kong 
Monetary Authority, explains that Hong Kong will contribute to further reform of China's 
financial system mainly in three aspects. Firstly, Hong Kong commercial banks that have 
branches  in  the  Mainland  will  not  only  bring  in  capital  but  also  transfer  the  advanced 
management skills and experiences. Secondly, the mainland banks will use Hong Kong as 
the springboard and bridge to "go global". And thirdly, Hong Kong may play a role in 
promoting RMB as an international currency as well as in promoting the circulation of 
RMB  outside  the  Mainland  (Chan  [2010]).  Hong  Kong  seems  to  be  developing  as  an 
offshore center of RMB transactions. The pilot schemes of the RMB denominated bond 
issuance and the RMB trade settlement in Hong Kong may catalyze the deregulation of the 
financial markets in the Mainland. 
Thus  far,  the  executives  of  major  banks  seem  to  be  still  conservative  to  promote 
international  businesses.  However,  some  market  participants  expect  that  under   
globalization,  if  Chinese  banks  do  not  offer  enterprises  financial  services  offshore,  the 




(5)Essential Structural Reform for the Further Development 
Condition of Corporate Sector's Demand for Funds 
In spite of the high pace of the economic growth, China has avoided serious inflation for 
over ten years. However, the recent rapid growth of money supply, considerable fluctuations 
in bank loans, and partial overheating of the stock and property markets may imply that 
macro-economic control by relevant authorities has not worked very effectively. 
                                                   
29  AFP [2011] 25 
 
In  China,  the  corporate  sector  as  a  whole  has  been  the  fund-shortage  sector,  but 
simultaneously,  the  corporate  sector's  savings  rate  has  been  increasing  in  recent  years 
(Figure 11 and 12). The large-sized SOEs accumulated a considerable amount of reserves 
throughout 2000s. Kujis [2006] argues that high corporate savings and capital transfers 
from the government to the large-sized SOEs generally play a much larger role in corporate 
financing than borrowing from financial institutions. 
 






















Source: Zhou [2009] 
 
The central government has been gradually changing the policy related to the corporate 
finance: it began to require higher dividends from SOEs, to increase the wage standard, and 
to improve welfare to employees. Along with the changes, the SOEs' demand for external 


































Demand for Funds for Urbanization 
In the 10th Five-year Plan (2001–2005) of which original plan was announced in October 
2000, the CPC proposed to widely implement the strategy for urbanization, and the urban 
population has increased to 47 percent of the total population in 2009 (it was  only 18 
percent in 1978). Chen Yuan, Chairman of the China Development Bank, estimates that 
China needs about RMB 225 trillion of fixed asset investment until the proportion of the 
urban  population  reaches  to  75  percent  (Chen  [2010]),  the  average  of  the  East  Asian 
urbanized  countries.  Chen  also  estimates  that  the  urbanization  process  would  be 
implemented rather gradually. From these points of view, the demand for funds to carry out 
fixed asset investment would continue to be strong for a long time. It would not difficult for 
the Chinese banks to find construction projects if they do not care the efficiency. 
However, China's investment efficiency is relatively low. For example, among several Asian 
countries under the high economic growth eras, the marginal capital coefficient, one of the 
indicators that analyze the efficiency of the investment with respect to the economic growth, 
is  relatively  high  in  China,  India,  Indonesia  and  Malaysia  (Table  11).  The  Chinese 
government is trying to change the mechanism of fund allocation in order to improve the 
investment efficiency. In this process, the commercial banks are also expected to pay more 
attention to efficiency of projects when they extend loans
30. 
 
                                                   
30  In  recent  years,  the  PBC and  CBRC  often  require  commercial  banks  not  to  extend  loans  to 
inefficient fixed asset investments such as: investments in small steel mills, coal mines of low quality, 
and old factories spreading air, water, and soil pollution etc. 27 
 
Table 11: Marginal Capital Coefficient of Asian Countries during the High Economic 
Growth Eras 




Average of real 
GDP growth rate 




during the era   
(% of nominal GDP of 







1981-1990  9.29  35.19  3.79 
1991-2000  10.42  37.79  3.63 
2001-2005  9.76  39.98  4.10 




1981-1990  5.55  20.78  3.74 
1991-2000  5.46  24.21  4.43 
2001-2005  6.97  29.07  4.17 
2006-2009  7.95  35.78  4.50 
Japan  1966-1970  11.09  36.23  3.27 
Korea, Rep. of  1986-1990  9.64  32.45  3.37 
Indonesia  1989-1993  8.29  30.95  3.73 
Malaysia  1992-1996  9.56  40.17  4.20 
The Philippines  2003-2007  5.73  15.61  2.72 
Thailand  1987-1991  10.93  35.95  3.29 
Note: Economic growth era for other than China and India refers to the five-year time during which the average real 
GDP growth rate marks the highest for the country.   
Sources: China Statistical Yearbook 2010, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 2009-2010 (Reserve Bank of 
India), Cabinet Office of Japan, the World Development Indicators (World Bank), and White Paper on 
International Economy and Trade, 2006 (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan) 
 
Capital Markets' Development 
In recent years, both the financial authorities and the CCP members have recognized the 
usefulness of the capital markets. In accordance with the Opinions of the State Council on 
Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Markets issued in 2004, the 
Chinese  government  has  implemented a  wide range  of  reform.  It  includes  unifying  the 
non-tradable and tradable shares, improving the quality of listed companies, restructuring 
securities firms, promoting the development of institutional investors, reforming the IPO 
process, and developing the corporate bond market. 
However, the growth of capital markets in China has been relatively subdued. In particular, 
the  Chinese  authorities  have  been  rather  cautious  regarding  the  repayment  ability  of 
enterprises, and the permission for bond issuance continues to be restricted. Most short-term 
and medium-term corporate bonds are issued in the inter-bank bond market where only the 
limited investors such as banks and institutional investors can purchase them. As compared 28 
 
to the scale of the economy, the outstanding bond issuance is not large (Figure 13). In order 
to  improve  the  function of  corporate  bond markets,  it  is  also  imperative  to  establish  a 
reliable credit rating system and a more transparent accounting system. 
 











Note：In this figure, the "government bond" consists of bonds issued by central government, other government 
entities, and central bank. 
Source: Asian Bonds Online 
 
Though it would take a long time to develop well functioning corporate bond markets in 
China, Chinese commercial banks should be prepared for the situation that the large-sized 
leading enterprises may prefer bond issuance to bank loans when bond issuance with more 
flexible interest rates becomes possible. 
 
Risk Management and Banks' Corporate Governance 
Although  major  commercial  banks  have  been  improving  their  risk  management  system 
since 2002 by establishing special committees, strengthening internal audit, and training 
managers and staff, it is widely regarded that banks do not pay sufficient attention to risk 
management (especially at the branch level). Only a little effective effort has been made to 
restrain numerous risk factors before they escalate and become significantly bigger issues. 
Through the ownership reform, the listed commercial banks  now hold the shareholders' 
general  meetings,  board  of  directors'  meetings,  and  board  of  supervisors'  and  senior 




































































































































































































































that the shareholders of the four largest commercial banks are largely dominated by the 
government, and the shareholders other than the government have a rather limited say in the 
decision making process. Most of the non-listed commercial banks have a close relationship 
with local governments through share holding. Considering the commercial banks' lending 
activities with large SOEs and local governments, we are still required to place a reservation 
for evaluating the actual extent of improvement in the banks' corporate governance. 
 
4. Japan's Experiences under Financial Liberalization 
China's financial system continues to place various restrictions in order to control capital 
movement. However, with the further integration of the Chinese economy into the global 
economy, the demands of domestic enterprises and individuals for global flexible usage of 
funds would become much stronger. Accordingly, the functioning of the Chinese banks 
would be required to be more flexible and more market-oriented to fulfill those demands. In 
order to envision the future design of the banking system reform, it may be useful to review 
the process of the financial liberalization in Japan as well as the responses of the domestic 
commercial banks to it in the 1970s and 1980s when Japan faced the problem of excessive 
savings. 
 
(1) Background of Financial Liberalization 
Takahashi and Kobayakawa [2003] summarized the following three changes that brought 
the  Japanese  economy  to  a  crucial  turning  point  in  the  1970s:  (1)  the  phase  of  rapid 
economic  growth  had  come  to  an  end  and  the  growth  rate  began  tracing  a  downtrend 
(Figure 14). Among several factors that could explain the decline of the growth rate, the 
most noteworthy and fundamental factor was the end of the migration of labor from the 
agricultural to the industrial sectors. (2) The Japanese public began expressing a desire for a 
shift in the government's growth-oriented policy goals. For example, public demand for 
reducing  environmental  pollution,  developing  social  welfare,  and  more  sophisticated 
management  of  their  financial  assets  became  stronger.  (3)  The  foreign  pressure  to 
deregulate and open up Japanese markets was substantially increasing. The relatively good 





















Source: Cabinet Office of Japan 
 
The end of high economic growth effected a significant change in Japan's capital flows. 
Funding  shortfalls  in  the  corporate  sector  dwindled.  A  savings  surplus  continued  to 
accumulate in the household sector. This surplus was absorbed by the public finance and 
foreign sectors (current account surplus, Figure 15). Since then, Japan has maintained the 
structure with current account surplus. 
 
















Source: Cabinet Office of Japan 
 
The slower economic growth also fundamentally changed the national fiscal balance. The 
tax revenue growth rate came to be too small to fill fiscal expenditure that started increasing 
due to social welfare expenditure and economic stimulus plans. In order to offset the fiscal 
deficit,  the  Japanese  government  increased  its  reliance  on  government  bond  issuance 
(Figure 16). The Japanese government bonds (JGBs) had initially been purchased by banks. 
However, the expanding volume of the issuance necessitated that the bonds be floated in the 
financial  markets.  The interest  rates  on  JGBs  were  accordingly  deregulated  in  order  to 
improve the appeal of JGBs as investment vehicles. 31 
 











Source: Nakagawa [1992] 
 
The Japanese households' financial assets had been increasing significantly. The outstanding 
financial assets of households in Japan accounted for 90 percent of the GDP at the end of 
the fiscal year (FY) 1964, which increased to 117 percent at the end of FY 1972, and to 239 
percent at the end of FY 1988 (Figure 17). The households' demand for higher return on 
investments  bearing  higher  risks  was  one  of  the  substantial  factors  that  promoted  the 
financial liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s. 
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Although Japan ranked second in the world in terms of its GDP size in 1968, it ranked 
around 20th in terms of per capita GDP, and the Japanese were confident that there was still 
prospect for further development. Even the drastic appreciation of the Japanese currency 
since 1971 and the oil shock in 1974 provided opportunities for the Japanese economy to 
advance  to  the  new  economic  structure  with  a  higher  level  of  technology.  Under  such 
situation, Japan started the structural reform of the economy and promoted the financial 
liberalization. 
 
(2) Impact on the Operations and Responses of Commercial Banks 
The financial liberalization process in Japan was a phased and gradual approach, although 
the pace of this process accelerated in the late 1980s. For example, the liberalization of the 
deposit interest rates took 15 years, and the full scale of liberalization of capital and foreign 
exchange transactions took 34 years (Annex 1 and 2). However, the regulation of interest 
rates and separation of financial business were substantially relaxed in the late 1980s. 
Substantial Influence on the Fund Management of Non-financial Corporations 
Large Japanese enterprises began issuing corporate bonds in the "euro-yen" market and they 
were mostly purchased by Japanese institutional investors such as life insurance companies, 
and partially by foreign investors. This was a significant change for both fundraisers and 
investors. For fundraisers, the process of the issuance of "euro-bond" was easier and more 
flexible than that of the domestic bond. For investors, the yield of "euro-bonds" was higher 
than that of the bonds issued by the same Japanese corporations in the Japanese market. 
The deregulation of foreign exchange control also promoted the liberalization of interest 
rates. When a foreign exchange futures market for risk hedging works, interest rates need to 
be consistent with pricing in the foreign exchange market. In other words, the development 
of  the  futures  market  of  foreign  exchange  would  work  as  a  catalyst  for  interest  rate 
liberalization. 
The  opening  up  of  market-based  funding  for  non-financial  corporations  effected  a 
fundamental change in the relationship between the banking sector and the non-financial 
corporate sectors in the late 1980s. A subset of the non-financial corporations, especially 
large manufacturing firms, ceased to rely on bank financing and tapped the capital markets 
instead (Hattori, Shin, and Takahashi [2009]). 33 
 
Decrease of Rent for Banks 
The banks lost the rent that was previously protected by the regulations on interest rates. 
Table 12 presents the changes in the lending and deposit rates in accordance with financial 
liberalization. Even in 1985, before the completion of the deposit rate liberalization, the 
commercial banks had to face rapid narrowing of the lending margin in Japan
31. 
 
Table 12: Interest Rate Differences in Japan and China 
  Japan  China(1) 
End of 1970  End of 1985  End of 2010  End of 1991  End of 2010 








(1-3 years,   
including 3 years) 
5.85 
(1-3 years,   
including 3 years)     







(6 months or less) 
5.35 
(6 months or less) 
Short Term Deposit 
(3 months)          (b)  4.00(5)  3.50(5)  0.441(6)  3.24  2.25 
(a)-(b)  2.25  2.00  1.034  4.86  3.10 
Notes:   
(1) The base rates for Renminbi lending and deposit set by the PBC. 
(2) The interest rate adopted and released by Mizuho Corporate Bank. 
(3) The rate surveyed under the Temporary Interest Rates Adjustment Law. 
(4) The lowest interest rate adopted by the six city banks. Since January 23, 1989, these banks have independently set 
the rate taking into consideration funding costs and other factors. 
(5) The BOJ guide-line rate. 
(6) The monthly average interest rate on time deposit of less than 3 million yen by 3 months posted at financial 
institutions. 
Sources: BOJ and PBC 
 
On the other hand, the introduction of time deposits with liberalized interest rates enabled 
the firms to increase funds by tapping the capital market without paying much attention to 
the  timing  of  the  disbursement  for  fixed  asset  investments.  Before  the  market-oriented 
financial product was available, Japanese firms could not hold funds in the deposit accounts 
yielding competitive market interest  revenue. Therefore, the opportunity cost of holding 
unused  liquidity  was  so  high  that  the  firms  had  to  carefully  plan  fundraisings  and 
disbursements. Competitive market interest rates and flexible term of time deposits with 
liberalized interest rates compelled non-financial enterprises to resort to exploring various 
fundraising alternatives. 
                                                   
31  The liberalization of deposit interest rate was initiated in October 1985 when the restriction on the 
interest rates on large time deposits of over 1 billion yen was lifted, and gradually progressed until 
October 1994. 34 
 
Banks' Responses 
Okazaki and Hoshi [2002] summarized that the financial liberalization in Japan during the 
1980s was especially slow in terms of the diversification of the investment opportunities for 
households and the expansion of the business scope for banks. The large enterprises began 
investing  in  the  securities  markets  or  accumulated  their  own  capital,  and  reduced  their 
dependency on bank lending. However, the deposits continued to flow into the banking 
sector. Commercial banks had to cope with the narrowing lending margin rent and reducing 
traditional  customer  base.  Eventually,  in  pursuit  of  higher  returns,  banks  rushed  into 
property-related lending and lending to SMEs. 
Delay in Changing the Business Model 
In  the  review  of  Japan's  situation  in  the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  fundamental  structural 
changes in the financial sector as well as the economic system as a whole are rather evident. 
An underlying aspect of these changes was that Japan's economy experienced the end of a 
high  growth  period  and  entered  an era  of  lower growth.  Nishimura  [2003],  the  former 
Director-General  of  the  Banking  Bureau  of  Japan's  Ministry  of  Finance,  argued  that 
considering the competitiveness of the Japanese financial sector during those days, it was 
not a realistic choice for them to aggressively expand their business scope by considering 
global demand in their business. Instead, they should have adjusted the over-capacity of the 
traditional commercial banking business. However, most of the banks adopted the volume 
expansion strategy. 
In the 1980s, the Japanese commercial banks extended loans virtually only against collateral, 
mainly in the form of stock and real estate. However, these banks did not carefully evaluate 
collateral and they relied on the possibility that the prices of stock and real estate would 
continue to increase, since they had never experienced a prolonged or/and serious decrease 
in asset prices in the economy. It has often been indicated that banks' risk assessment and 
management systems were not well designed during the bubble period. In an extreme case, 
for example, the functions of the loan departments and the risk management departments 
were merged into one unit for speedy decision-making regarding loans. In retrospect, these 
kinds  of  organizational  changes  compromised  the  strictness  of  the  loan  classification 
standards. 
The regulatory changes also required the financial authorities to adapt to a new regime. The 35 
 
so-called  "convoy  system"  that  sustained  the  financial  stability  with  discretionary 
administration and strict regulations including the one on interest rates came to be obsolete 
and  the  financial  administration  needed  to  change  in  line  with  financial  liberalization. 
However, it also took time to change the manner. The supervisory authorities  failed  to 
convince the commercial banks of the need to conduct a rational risk assessment of their 
loan  portfolio  since  they  were  also  under  the  influence  of  the  optimistic  expectations 
regarding the Japanese economy  in the euphoric atmosphere that existed in the country 
during the late 1980s. With respect to the related legal infrastructures, the scheme for the 
disposal of NPLs that would be effective in the case a NPL problem would threaten the 
solvency of banks had not yet been established. 
(3) Lessons 
The occurrence and burst of the bubble in Japan during the late 1980s can be attributed to 
numerous  complex  factors.  Okina,  Shirakawa,  and  Shiratsuka  [2001]  discussed  the 
following  factors  with  respect  to  functioning  of  the  bubble  economy:  bank  behavior, 
monetary policy, land policy, accounting system, and self-confidence in the country, etc. 
(Figure  18).  The  commercial  banks  in  Japan  delayed  the  introduction  of  the  necessary 
corporate  governance  and  risk  management  reforms.  Moreover,  they  were  too  slow  to 
change their business model in accordance with changes in their function in the economy 
from "arbitrage finance" to "value-adding finance." 
It should be noted that the supervisory system being called "convoy system," economic rent 
given to commercial banks accepting various regulations, and insufficient legal system for 
handling bankruptcy of banks were mutually related and complementary to each other in the 
1980s.  However,  the  regulatory  framework  reform  in  the  1980s  lacked attention  to  the 
complementarity between them. For example, comprehensive reform of financial sector did 
not proceed, while the deregulation of interest rates went forward separately. Moreover, the 
supervisory authorities abolished restrictions on enterprises' fund-raising in the securities 
market in the 1980s, but they only allowed banks' phased entry into the securities business. 
Banks were very concerned that major enterprises would become less dependent on them 
for funding. This concern was a key factor for the fierce lending competition in the late 
1980s. These experiences of Japan point to the importance of comprehensive reform and 
carefully considered sequence of its process. 36 
 
Figure 18: Illustration of the Bubble Economy in Japan 
Source: Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka [2001] 
 
Japanese banks took a long time to resolve their NPL problems. Meanwhile, one of the 
positive outcomes of the Japan's experiences of the bubble burst is the establishment of a 
legal system for handling the bankruptcy of banks and rules for the injection of public 
money  for  overcoming  the  problems  in  the  banking  system.  In  2003,  the  Japanese 
government established the Financial System Management Council with a legal base, which 
has the authority to decide the manner in which public fund will be utilized for resolving the 
issues that led to the bankruptcy of banks. When the recent global financial crisis occurred, 
such  a  legal  system  had  not  been  concretely  established  even  in  the  most  developed 
countries. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
Since 2002, the Chinese banking system reform began pursuing the implementation of more 
market-oriented  mechanisms  and  contributed  to  the  stability  of  the  country's  financial 
system. China successfully prevented the economic shocks due to the global financial crisis 
from adversely affecting its domestic financial markets, and provided sufficient funds to 
boost the economy. Thus far, both the quantity and quality of the assets and capital of major 
commercial banks have improved, and these banks are aggressively increasing their assets 
in order to gain more profits. Moreover, the large Chinese banks are gradually increasing 
their presence in the global market. 
However, the overall economic system reform toward a market-oriented economy is still 
underway in China. In recent years, it is becoming much more difficult for the government 
to control fund allocation by the old style of management. For example, the government's 
direct guidance and intervention in the decision-making process of commercial banks and 
enterprises  have  become  less  effective.  One  of  the  factors  that  prevent  the  market 
mechanisms from functioning effectively is the regulated interest rates. As the draft of the 
12th Five Year Plan indicates, the government intends to gradually promote market-based 
interest rate reform in the coming five years. This reform would not be so fast, because the 
government would put priority on economic and social stability. Nonetheless, the change of 
the  interest  rate  mechanism  would  require  commercial  banks  to  change  their  fund 
management. 
Simultaneously, the Chinese commercial banks should adapt to the trend of globalization in 
the  country's  economy.  Owing  to  the  strict  control  of  cross-border  capital  transactions 
to/from China, thus far, the international businesses of banks are not developed widely. 
However,  the  country's  "go  global"  policy  requires  Chinese  banks  to  support  other 
enterprises' global ventures. In addition, the fact that banks have been permitted to conduct 
certain experimental operations with trade settlements for expanding  the usage of RMB 
outside the country strongly implies the further development of the international business of 
Chinese banks.   
Considering the diversification of the domestic investment opportunities, development of 
urbanization, and integration of the Chinese economy  with  the  global  one, the Chinese 
banking system would be required to become more market-oriented and more global. For 38 
 
this purpose, it is critical whether the  government allows banks to allocate funds more 
flexibly and whether banks allocate funds more efficiently on their own responsibility. 
In Japan, the main bank system, which supported the customers' finances from a long-term 
perspective in case they experienced any financial difficulty, contributed to the high growth 
of the Japanese economy. During the 1980s, some Japanese commercial banks were ranked 
among the world's top ten banks in terms of asset size and were perceived  to be quite 
successful.  However,  the  relatively  large  interest  rate  margins  that  were  protected  by 
government regulation were an important factor for banks to absorb economic shocks. A 
similar structure wherein the well-protected banks support enterprises also exists in China. 
In the 1980s, Japanese banks played an imported role in ensuring economic stability in the 
country by absorbing various economic shocks. However, they faced serious NPL problems, 
which affected economic development during the 1990s rather negatively. One of the main 
causes of the serious NPL problems in Japan was the failure of the banks to reconstruct their 
business models by adjusting to the liberalization of interest rates under the fundamental 
structural changes of the economy. In addition, it should be noted that the sequence of the 
overall  financial  liberalization  had  some  inconsistency.  The  delay  of  changes  in  the 
regulatory and legal systems surrounding banks was also responsible for the problems. 
Economic  history  indicates  that  a  financial  crisis  often  happens  with  deregulations  or 
financial  innovations  under  financial  liberalization.  The  Japan's  experiences  during  the 
1980s  and  1990s  as  well  as  the  recent  subprime  crisis  in  the  US  suggest  that  the 
aforementioned observation is applicable in these cases. Therefore, from this perspective, 
what can we say regarding China? Certain similarities between the NPL problems in Japan 
and China in the late 1990s have often been indicated. However, certain differences should 
also be noted; the Chinese NPL problem during the 1990s was not caused by the strong 
effect of financial liberalization, but the general economic reform, particularly that of the 
SOEs'. Full-blown financial liberalization has not yet begun in China. 
Considering the accelerated development and globalization of its economy, the demand for 
financial liberalization in China will increase. China may face significant challenges with 
respect to the manner in which financial liberalization must be accompanied by appropriate 
structural  adjustments  in  the  banking  sector.  The  Japanese  as  well  as  the  US  and  the 
European banks have struggled to identify a new and appropriate business model under the 39 
 
rapid developments in financial technology and the fundamental changes of the economic 
growth model. Considering the large scale of the economy and the high regional disparity in 
the country, the challenges that China faces in the future may be more complex and diverse. 40 
 
Annex 1: History of Interest Rate Liberalization in Japan 
Year  Month  Changes in the Regulation 
1947  Dec.  Temporary Interest Rates Adjustment Law enforced. 
1949  Dec.  Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law enforced. 
1979  Apr.  Call rate liberalized. 
May  Negotiable certificates of deposit introduced. 
Oct.  Trade bill rate liberalized. 
1980  Jan.  Medium-term government bond funds introduced. 
Dec.  Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law amended. 
1982  Apr.  New Banking Law enforced. 
1984  Apr.  Sales of foreign CDs and CP permitted. 
Dec.  Interest rates on short-term euro-yen CDs liberalized. 
1985  Mar.  Money market certificates introduced. 
July  Interest rates on medium- and long-term euro-yen CDs liberalized. 
Aug.  Large-lot open-end bond investment trusts introduced.   
Oct  Interest rates on large time deposits over 1 billion yen liberalized. 
1986  Mar.  Long-term government bond funds introduced. 
1989  June  Small-lot money market certificates over 3 million yen introduced. 
1991  Nov.  Interest rates on time deposit over 3 million yen liberalized 
1992  Mar.  Money management funds introduced. 
1993  June  Interest rates on time deposits fully liberalized. 
1994  Oct.  Interest rates on demand deposits (excluding current accounts) liberalized. 
1998  June  CD issue terms fully liberalized. 










Annex 2: History of Capital Account Liberalization in Japan 
Year  Month  Changes in the Regulation 
1964  Apr.  Japan accepts IMF Article  Ⅷ  obligations. 
Japan becomes an OECD member. 
1968  Feb.  Yen conversion controls introduced to restrict conversion of foreign currencies into yen 
and domestic investment in yen. 
1971  July  Upper limit on foreign securities purchased by investment trusts and insurance companies 
abolished. 
Aug.  US suspends dollar conversion to gold (the so-called 'Nixon Shock') 
Dec.  IMF parity changed to ¥308/US$ (Smithsonian rate) and band widened by +/- 2.5%. 
1972  Feb.  Purchase of foreign securities by trust banks liberalized. 
Mar.  Purchase of foreign securities by commercial banks liberalized. 
June  Outward foreign direct investment liberalized. 
1973  Feb.  Floating exchange rate regime introduced. 
May  Inward direct investment liberalized with exception of five categories of business. 
Dec.  Yen conversion controls on banks partially eased (non-residents permitted to hold yen 
accounts <except inter-office accounts>). 
1974  Jan.  'Voluntary restraint', to balance net foreign securities investments by banks, securities 
companies, investment trusts and insurance companies introduced. 
1976  Nov.  Conditions attaching to outward long-term bank loans are eased. 
1977  Mar.  'Voluntary restraint' on foreign securities investments by banks abolished. 
June  Acquisition of foreign equities and bonds by residents belonging to foreign companies 
permitted. 
Regulations on net open positions of residents abolished. 
1979  Jan.  Regulations on acquisition of yen-denominated bonds excluding those with remaining 
maturity of more than one year by non-residents relaxed. 
May  Repo transactions by non-residents liberalized (gensaki market). 
CD issuance commenced. 
June  Short-term impact loans introduced and regulations on long-term impact loans lifted. 
1980  Dec.  New Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law implemented; in-and -out 
transactions free in principle. 
1984  Apr.  Regulations based on the principle of real demand related to forward foreign exchange 
transactions abolished. 
June  Regulations regarding the conversion of foreign currency-denominated funds into yen 
abolished. 
Yen-denominated loans to residents contracted in overseas markets liberalized. 
1986  Dec.  Japan Offshore Market (JOM) established. 
1995  June  Restriction on number of new branches that a bank can establish removed. 
Aug.  Recycling restrictions on yen-denominated bonds issued by non-residents in overseas 
markets abolished. 
1996  Nov.  'Big-Bang' reform of capital market announced. 
1997  Dec.  Ban on financial holding companies lifted. 
1998  Apr.  Revised Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law enforced. 
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